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INTRODUCTION

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized an implied warranty that
services will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. The
policy grounds that led to the court's decision would support recognition of the warranty in all service transactions-professional or nonprofessional. Should "professional" services be exempted from the
warranty? If so, how will "professional" services be defined? So far,
these questions have not been clearly answered by the Texas Supreme
Court, and there has been some apparent equivocation. This article
discusses arguments for and against limiting the warranty and concludes that no sound basis exists for excluding professional services.
II.

THE GENESIS: MELODY HOME

v. BARNES

In Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,' the Texas Supreme
* B.B.A. & J.D., University of Texas; Associate, Longley & Maxwell, Austin, Texas;
Managing Editor,

TEXAS CONSUMER LAW REPORTER.

1. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
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Court recognized an implied warranty that repairs to a mobile home
would be performed in a good and workmanlike manner.2 In the context of that particular case, the decision should have come as no surprise. Although there were four separate opinions, all justices agreed
with the result.' It was the extent to which this implied warranty will
be applied in other contexts that divided the court and has generated
much debate.
As a general principle, an implied warranty that services will be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner is fair, makes sense,
and is good policy. People are entitled to expect that when they hire
someone to perform services those services will be performed with
good workmanship. Stated another way, people should not have to
assume that services they pay for will be performed in a bad and unworkmanlike manner.'
The facts in Melody Home practically compelled the result. Lonnie
and Donna Barnes bought a modular, pre-fabricated house manufactured by Melody Home.' From the beginning the house was damp,
and the Barneses found puddles of water. 6 Over two years after moving in, they discovered that a sink had not been connected to the drain
in one of the interior walls.' The resulting leaks soaked the insulation, caused mold on the walls, crumbled the sheetrock, and rotted
the floor.' Melody Home sent repairmen out, but they made things
even worse.9 The repairmen cut and tore linoleum in the house and
failed to connect the washing machine drain, which caused the house
to flood, which in turn damaged the floors, cabinets, and carpets.' 0
The repairmen also made obscene gestures at Donna Barnes. "
The jury found Melody Home knowingly failed to repair the home

2. Id. at 354.
3. Id. at 350. In addition to the opinion written by Justice Spears, Justice Campbell
wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Wallace, Justice Gonzalez wrote a concurring
opinion joined by Chief Justice Hill, and Justice Mauzy also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at
356, 361.
4. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 5.04 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989).
5. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 351; see also Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 708 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986), aff'd, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987)(discusses facts of case).
9. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 351.
10. Id.
II. Melody Homes, 708 S.W.2d at 602.
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in a good and workmanlike manner.' 2 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed this finding and held that breach of this implied warranty was actionable under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
3
Protection Act.'
After losing in the trial court and court of appeals, Melody Home
argued to the Texas Supreme Court that its repair services did not
carry an implied warranty that they would be performed in a good
and workmanlike manner.' 4 Detailing numerous public policy considerations supporting its decision, the supreme court adopted an implied warranty requiring that all service providers will perform in a
good and workmanlike manner.' 5 In so holding, the majority overruled the court's recent decision in Dennis v. Allison,' 6 which had held
that an implied warranty does not arise in "professional" service
transactions. ' I
On rehearing, the supreme court restated the issue as "whether an
implied warranty applies to repair or modification services of existing
tangible goods or property."' 8 The court then narrowly held that "an
implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner is available to consumers
suing under the DTPA."' 9 This limited holding appeared to leave
Dennis v. Allison intact.
A clear understanding of the importance of the court's equivocation on this point justifies a brief digression to the Dennis v. Allison
opinion. Myrna Dennis sued her psychiatrist, Dr. T. H. Allison, for
beating and sexually assaulting her while she was under his care for
psychiatric problems.20 Her sole theory of recovery was that Dr. Allison breached an implied warranty by violating the ethical canons for
psychiatrists.2 ' After a jury verdict in favor of Dennis, the Texas

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 490 (June 17, 1987),
withdrawn, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
15. Id. at 491.
16. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985).
17. Id. at 96.
18. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes. 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987).
19. Id. All references to the "DTPA" are to the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act. TEX. Bus. & COM.CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (Vernon 1987).
20. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 94 (Tex. 1985).
21. Id. at 95.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:685

Supreme Court held there was no such implied warranty. 22 The majority opinion equated implied warranty liability with strict liability
and held it was "not necessary to impose an implied warranty theory
as a matter of public policy because the plaintiff patient has adequate
remedies to redress wrongs committed during treatment. ' 23 The
other remedies alluded to were causes of action for assault and battery
and for medical malpractice.24
Three justices dissented. Justice Ray, wrote for the dissenters:
"To hold that a psychiatrist does not impliedly warrant to his patients
that he will comply with the ethical commandments of his calling defies logic." ' 26 The illogic was that consumers of services were denied
the protections given to consumers of goods who had statutory remedies for breaches of implied warranties.2 7 While the dissenters were
not willing to make professional service providers guarantors of results, they believed that a professional at least should impliedly warrant that he or she would not breach the ethical commandments of his
or her calling.2 8 As for the argument that existing remedies provided
adequate protection, the dissenting justices responded that the injured
plaintiff was entitled to be the architect of her own lawsuit. 29 The
dissenters stated, "If the facts give rise to a particular theory of recovery, then a party has the right to assert that theory, regardless of the
' 30
applicability of other available theories."
The issue that divided the court in Dennis v. Allison set the stage for
the debate in Melody Home Manufacturing v. Barnes less than two
years later. In Melody Home the Texas Supreme Court cited Dennis
v. Allison to support the proposition that an implied warranty does
not arise in "professional" service transactions. "The policies supporting the recognition of an implied warranty for services such as
repairs apply equally to 'professional' services. Consequently, we
overrule Dennis and hold that all service providers impliedly warrant
that their services will be performed in a good and workmanlike man-

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 96.
Id.
Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1985).
Id. at 96 (Ray, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ray, J., dissenting).
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314-.315 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
Dennis v. Allison, 693 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. 1985)(Ray, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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ner."' Only two justices dissented from this holding.32
On rehearing, all hell broke loose. The court received a deluge of
amicus curiae briefs, in numbers normally reserved for only the most
earth-shaking decisions. In addition to an impassioned motion for rehearing from Melody Home, amicus curiae briefs were filed by the
Texas Automobile Dealers Association, Brown & Root, Inc., the
Texas Society of Architects, the Texas Association of Defense Counsel, the Texas Association of Realtors, the Texas Society of Certified
Public Accountants, the Texas Association of Builders, the Texas
Manufactured Housing Association, the Texas Society of Professional
Engineers, and the attorneys for the defendant in Archibald v. Act III
Arabians.3 3 The various amici offered differing criticisms, or at least
gave differing nuances to the same complaints, with the architects,
defense lawyers, realtors, and accountants particularly objecting to
having an implied warranty that "professional" services would be performed in a good and workmanlike manner.3 4
Approximately five months after its initial decision, the supreme
court issued a revised opinion.3 5 The opinion on rehearing left unchanged the outcome between the parties but limited the breadth of
the court's holding as to other cases, especially those involving professional services.36 The majority stated:
[T]his case presents the question whether an implied warranty applies
to repair or modification services of existing tangible goods or property.
The question whether an implied warranty applies to services in which
the essence of the transaction is the exercise of professional judgment by
the service provider is not before us. Cf. DeBakey v. Staggs, 612 S.W.2d
924 (Tex. 1981)(attorney's client suing under the DTPA for attorney's
"unconscionable" actions are "consumers"). But see Dennis v. Allison,
698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985)(implied warranty not available to doctor's

31. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 491 (June 17, 1987),
withdrawn, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
32. Id. at 494-95 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). Justice Gonzalez, joined by Chief Justice
Hill, disagreed with the majority's decision to overrule Dennis v. Allison. Id. Justice Campbell
concurred in the result, but would have made it prospective. Id. at 496.
33. 741 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.
1988). As will be discussed, the Archibald case also raised the issue of whether professional
services carry an implied warranty of good performance. See id. 755 S.W.2d at 85.
34. Copies for the briefs are available from the Clerk of the Texas Supreme Court, filed
under Cause No. C-5508.
35. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1987).
36. Id. at 354.
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patient injured by improper treatment).3 7
By leaving the professional services question for another day, the
court also left to conjecture and speculation what its decision will be.
Had the initial opinion telegraphed the outcome when the issue is de38
cided, or had the majority changed their minds?

III.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

It seemed the answer would soon be forthcoming once the Texas
Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal in Archibald v. Act III
Arabians.39 The case involved a claim against a horse trainer for injuries that made it necessary to destroy a valuable horse.4" The horse's
owner alleged both negligence and breach of an implied warranty that
the horse training services would be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. 4' The jury found negligence but failed to find it was
a proximate cause of the horse's death.4 2 The jury did find, however,
that the trainer breached his implied warranty and that the breach
was a producing cause of the death of the horse.43
The court of appeals stated the issue as "whether Texas law recognizes an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance of
personal services rendered by a professional." 4 4 The court concluded
that by "accepting the horse for training, Act III impliedly promised
to train the horse in a good and workmanlike manner," but this implied promise did not rise to the level of a separately actionable warranty.4 5 Archibald's only remedies were for breach of contract, which
was not alleged, and for negligence, which was found against him.4 6

37. Id.
38. At least two justices who agreed with the substance of the original opinion clearly
appeared to have changed views. Justice Campbell, who initially disagreed only with retroactive application of the court's decision, filed a new concurring opinion on rehearing, in which
he "oppose[d] the creation of an implied warranty applicable to all services." Id. at 356
(Campbell, J., concurring). In this, he was joined by Justice Wallace. Id. Of course, their
apparent change is no predictor of what the court will do, since both have left the court.
39. 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Archibald v. Act IIIArabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. 1988).
44. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 741 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).
45. Id. at 959.
46. Id.
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The court did not discuss whether horse training was properly considered a "professional" service or what definition applied to distinguish between "non-professional" and "professional" services if the
latter were to be excluded from the implied warranty.4 7
The supreme court decided the case on a basis that scrupulously
avoided any mention of the "professional" versus "non-professional"
issue." The court narrowly held that a horse is a good, and that
horse training, therefore, involved the modification of an existing tangible good.4 9 So characterized, the transaction fit squarely within the
scope of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance
recognized in Melody Home."
In his dissent, Justice Gonzalez appeared interested in deciding
whether the implied warranty extended to "professionals."" l He
would have held that horse training was a professional service and,
therefore, was not subject to the Melody Home implied warranty. 2
Because Justice Gonzalez believed the horse owner had judicially admitted that horse training was a "professional" service,53 his opinion
offers little help for deciding in future cases whether other services are
or are not "professional." Justice Gonzalez noted that the majority
"arguably" had nullified the professional/non-professional distinction
by focusing on whether the service provider was engaged in the modification or repair of an existing good. 4 If this view is correct, even
"professional" services would be subject to the Melody Home implied
warranty when modification or repair of an existing tangible good is
involved. 5 However, the court's pointed silence on the issue of

47. Id. at 959-60.
48. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Tex. 1988).
49. Id. at 86.
50. Id. Two roof repair cases also fit squarely within the implied warranty as limited to
the repair or modification of existing goods. McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., 769
S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 853 F.2d 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1988).
51. Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez, J.. dissenting).
52. Id. at 87-88 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting),
53. Archibald v. Act Ill Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. 1988)(Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justices Wallace and Culver also dissented, but they argued that the majority should not
have extended the Melody Home warranty to cover horse training. They agreed with the
position of the court of appeals that existing contract and negligence remedies were enough.
Like the court of appeals, they did not discuss the professional/non-professional distinction.
Id. at 86-87 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 88 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
55. Comment, The Inplied Warranty of Good and Workmanlike PerformanceExtends to
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whether horse training was a "professional" service makes reliance on
this argument precarious.
The few cases decided since Melody Home have not done much to
define the extent to which professional services are subject to the implied warranty, if in fact the warranty has any application in professional service transactions. In Coulson v. Lake L.B.J. Municipal
Utility District,5 6 the supreme court apparently assumed that the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance would apply to
a professional engineer's services in preparing plans. 57 The disagreement between the majority and the two concurring justices was
whether there was any substantive difference between negligence and
breach of the implied warranty.58 The reliability of Coulson as an
indicator of the court's direction is questionable because the case was
decided on July 1, 1987, after the first Melody Home opinion but
before the opinion on rehearing in Melody Home and before the narrow opinion in Archibald.
The supreme court continued the uncertainty with its 1988 decision
in Willis v. Maverick, 59 a legal malpractice case. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kilgarlin, treated Dennis v. Allison as still
excluding professional conduct from implied warranties, which would
be actionable under the DTPA. 60 Despite this apparent foreclosing of
an implied warranty cause of action for legal malpractice, Justice Kilgarlin ended the majority opinion with the cryptic statement, "Our
determination of whether a lawyer's professional conduct is actionable under the DTPA must await another day."'" Justice Mauzy
wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which he took the position that the "court has not expressly rejected the notion that an imProfessionalServices That Involve the Modification of an Existing Tangible Good: Archibald v.
Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988), 30 S. TEx. L. REV. 491, 492-93 (1989); see also
Recent Development, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 731, 732 (1989)(court held horse training modification of existing good).
56. 734 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
57. Id. at 651-52.
58. The majority stated that negligence encompassed breach of implied warranty. Id. at
651. The concurring justice, however, stated that negligence does not necessarily include a

breach of an implied warranty. Id. at 652-53 (Spears, J., concurring). Justice Spears, who
authored the majority opinion in Melody Home, wrote his concurring opinion in Coulson specifically to point out his disagreement with the majority's treatment of negligence and breach
of the implied warranty as being synonymous. Id. at 652-53 (Spears, J., concurring).
59. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
60. Id. at 647-48.
61. Id. at 648.
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plied warranty of good and workmanlike performance may apply to
the provision of legal services." 62
The opinion in Kennemore v. Bennett6 3 did not give the supreme

court any occasion to plow new ground on the scope of the warranty
of good workmanship. At issue was a homebuilder's breach of the
implied warranty by building a defective house. 6' This conduct
would have been actionable even prior to Melody Home, under Humber v. Morton.65
The more recent decision in Cosgrove v. Grimes66 perpetuated the
mixed signals of Coulson and Willis. Like Willis, Cosgrove also involved the potential application of the implied warranty to legal malpractice. 6' Like Coulson, Cosgrove raised the issue of the difference, if
any, between negligence and breach of the implied warranty. 68 The
jury was asked the following question: "Do you find that Defendant
Walter Grimes failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in applying the skill and knowledge at hand in the prosecution of the lawsuit arising from the July 15, 1976 collision?" 69 The
court viewed the jury's affirmative answer as a finding of negligence. °
Justice Spears, writing for a unanimous court, assumed for the sake
of argument that an implied warranty cause of action could exist
against an attorney, but held that the negligence issue did not submit
an implied warranty claim. 7' Underscoring the point made in his
concurrence in Coulson, Justice Spears now wrote for the entire court:
"At best the language of the submission vaguely alluded to a standard
of care, not to an implied warranty. Because the issue did not inquire
whether Grimes breached an implied warranty, Cosgrove may not recover on such a claim." 72 The Cosgrove opinion thus left undecided
62. Id. at 648 (Mauzy, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mauzy was joined by Justice Robertson. Id.
63. 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988).

64. Id. at 90.
65. 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968)(court held home builder liable for breach of implied
warranty of good and workmanlike manner); see also Western Steel Co. v. Coast Inv. Corp.,
760 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ)(complaint that work not
performed in good and workmanlike manner).
66. 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989).

67. Id. at 663.
68. Id. at 662-66.
69. Id. at 665 n.3.

70. Id. at 665.
71. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989).
72. Id.
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both issues-whether professional services are covered by the implied
warranty, and what the difference is between negligence and breach of
the warranty. Cosgrove also causes additional uncertainty on the latter point by appearing to mark an abandonment of the majority position in Coulson.
One court of appeals opinion, Forestpark Enterprises,Inc. v. Culpepper,13 squarely addressed the issue of whether the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance applies to professional
services.74 The court held it did not. 5 Forestpark Enterprises was a
sublessee of space in a shopping center where Anrem Corporation was
the property manager.7 6 Forestpark's suit alleged that Anrem
breached an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance
by failing to evict another tenant whose patrons were causing
Forestpark to lose business.7 7 Relying on Dennis v. Allison, the court
of appeals held that the Melody Home implied warranty of good and
workmanlike performance did not apply, because no modification or
repair of existing goods was involved and "Anrem's services involved
the exercise of professional judgment by the service provider. ' 78 The
opinion did not offer any guidance on how to distinguish "professional judgment" from the common run of judgments that would
carry an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance.7 9
The development of the law thus far has not answered whether professional services should be excluded from the Melody Home implied
warranty of good and workmanlike performance, nor has it shown
how we are to distinguish "professional" services if they are exempted. Lurking behind these issues is the question of what standard
professionals will be judged by if their services are held to carry an
implied guarantee of good workmanship. Perhaps this last question,
more than any other factor, drives the debate over including or excluding professional services.

73. 754 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
74. Id. at 779.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 777.
77. Forestpark Enters. v. Culpepper, 754 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988,
no writ).
78. Id. at 779.
79. See id. (court stated professional judgment required). One other court of appeals
decision suggested that the supreme court may be slow in expanding the implied warranty to
cover professional services. Thomas C. Cook, Inc. v. Rowhanian, 774 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

What is a "Professional"?

By now, the recurrent appearance of quotation marks with "professional" has no doubt signalled the uncertainy attending the use of the
word. What is a "professional"? If we are going to exclude them
from the implied warranty, we should at least come up with a credible
test for spotting them.
General definitions are not much use. True, Websters recognizes
the highbrow meaning of "professional" as "one who belongs to one
of the learned professions requiring a high level of training and proficiency" and, perhaps a step down, "characterized by or conforming to
the technical or ethical standards of a profession or an occupation." 80
But we are also given the journeymen's versions-"manifesting fine
artistry or workmanship based on sound knowledge and conscientiousness" and "reflecting the results of education, training, and experience. '"' Finally, we are left with the crassly commercial "engaged
or participated in by persons receiving financial return" and "one that
engages in a particular pursuit, study, or science for gain or
livelihood." 2
Using the monetary yardstick, anyone who customarily performs
services for pay, rather than for free, qualifies as a "professional."
Presumably, even the repairmen who started all this trouble in Melody Home would be professionals under this test. If paying for the
services excludes the transaction as "professional," the exception will
exclude all consumer transactions. A "consumer" is one who seeks or
acquires goods or services by purchase or lease,8 3 yet by the act of
purchasing or leasing, the consumer would convert the service pro80. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1811 (1976). The same
source offers a similarly noble companion definition of "profession" as:
[A] calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive preparation
including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods, maintaining by force of organization
or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its
members to continued study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the
rendering of a public service.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. "Profession" has a similar definition as "a principal calling, vocation, or employment." Id.
83. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
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vider into a "professional" who owed no implied warranty of good
workmanship.
The middle definition does begin to split out some occupations, but
without very satisfying results. For example, the horse trainer in Archibald might qualify as a professional, but the property manager in
Forestpark most likely would not.
The highest definition comes closest to describing what might be
called the "professionals by acclamation," those groups everyone
would consider "professional." Doctors and lawyers, to their relief,
would benefit from the exemption. The narrowness of this definition,
however, would certainly give the appearance of favoritism by shielding only a select group from warranty liability for shoddy services.
Another approach that has been suggested is to label as "professionals" those who are licensed and regulated by the state. This approach would exempt accountants, 84 air conditioning contractors, 5
architects,86 auctioneers," barbers," boxing and wrestling promoters,8 9 chiropractors, 9° cosmetologists, 9 ' day care center operators, 92
dentists, 93 dietitians,9 4 doctors, 95 employment agency operators, 96 en-

gineers, 9 funeral directors, 98 health spa operators,99 hearing aid fitters
and dispensers,"' ° insurance agents,'
lawyers, 0 2 massage ther0 3
apists,
nurses, 104 nursing home administrators,' 5 optometrists, 06
84. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-i (Vernon Supp. 1990).
85. Id. art. 8861.
86. Id. art. 249a (Vernon 1973).
87. Id. art. 8700 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
88. Id. art. 8407a.
89. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8501-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
90. Id. art. 4512b.
91. Id. art. 8451a.
92. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 44.031 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4548 (Vernon 1976).
94. Id. art. 4512h (Vernon Supp. 1990).
95. Id. art. 4495b.
96. Id. art. 5221a-7 (Vernon 1987).
97. Id. art. 3271a (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
98. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4582b (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
99. Id. art. 5221(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
100. Id. art. 4566 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
101. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1990).
102. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon 1988).
103. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512e (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
104. Id. art. 4518.
105. Id. art. 4442d.
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pest exterminators, 0 7 pharmacists,' 8 physical therapists, 0 9 physicians and surgeons," 0 plumbers,"' podiatrists," 2 polygraph examiners,'1 13 private investigators,'
psychologists,'' 5 real estate agents,
brokers, and real estate inspectors," 16 social workers," I7 speech pathologists,"' surveyors," 9 and veterinarians. 2 0 As this list shows, there
is no unifying theme to explain why state licensing should substitute
for common law relief. It could be argued that in fact the legislature
has determined that the public are particularly at risk when dealing
with these groups.
The fallacy of using state licensing as the basis for an exemption
from statutory liability was eloquently stated in 1973 when the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act was first being debated. A last-minute effort was made wholly to exempt from the
DTPA licensed "professionals." Senator Carl Parker, then a representative, stated, "Mr. Speaker and members. I have heard of a license to steal, but this is the first time I have ever seen it offered as an
amendment to a bill." The amendment was rejected.' 2 ' If the public
policy implications of including professional service transaction
within the scope of common law remedies concern the court, that
concern should be laid to rest by the legislative history showing that
when faced with a similar attempt to limit statutory protections for
Texas consumers, the legislature came down on the side of
22
inclusiveness.
Few useful definitional tools can be gleaned from Texas cases. In
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. art. 4552-3.07 (Vernon 1976).
TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 76.105 (Vernon 1982).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4542a (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
Id. art. 4512e.
Id. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1990).
Id. art. 6243-101 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1990).
Id. art. 4570 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(29cc) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
Id. art. 4413(29bb).

115. Id. art. 4512c.

116. Id. art. 6573a (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1990).
117. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 50.015 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512j (Vernon Supp. 1990).
119. Id. art. 5282c.
120. Id. art. 7465a (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1990).
121. Debate on Tex. H.B. 417 on the Floor of the House of Representatives, 63rd Leg. 2
(April 10, 1973)(transcript available from Senate Staff Services Office).
122. The legislative intent that the DTPA be all-encompassing -was noted by the court in
Melody Home. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 n.7 (Tex. 1987); see
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Dennis v. Allison, the court did not seriously consider whether the
psychiatrist was a "professional."' 3 Under any standard he would
be. The one potentially distinguishing factor mentioned in the opinion was the existence of a code of ethics the doctor had violated.12 4
The court also mentioned that in a professional service transaction the
consumer could identify the responsible party and pinpoint the specific wrong committed. 125 This latter point was made, however, to
distinguish the professional service transaction from a sale of massproduced goods, not to distinguish between professional and non-professional services. The court's statement would apply equally in
either type of service transaction. For example, the facts in Melody
Home show that the consumers were able to determine who was re126
sponsible and could pinpoint the specific wrong.
Even if one succeeds in effectively defining who will be called "professionals," there is still the question of what constitutes "professional
services." The court in Melody Home left the question open as to
''services in which the essence of the transaction is the exercise of
professional judgment by the service provider."' 127 It is not enough
that the services call for the exercise of judgment, the exercise of "pro128
fessional" judgment is required.
Every act by a "professional" does not necessarily require the exercise of judgment. For example, a lawyer may miss a filing deadline.
Conversely, services performed by those labelled "non-professional"
may require a great degree of skill and training, and the exercise of
judgment. A common example is the mechanic who is capable
of di1 29
agnosing and repairing a modern, computer-controlled car.
In the case of Barbee v. Rogers,130 the Texas Supreme Court did try

also Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. 1987)(holding no
implied exclusion of physicians and other health care providers from 1973 version of DTPA).
123. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 94-96 (Tex. 1985).
124. Id. at 94.
125. Id. at 96.
126. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 351.
127. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987)(emphasis added). The court of appeals purported to apply this standard without further definition in
Forestpark Enterprises. Forestpark Enters. v. Culpepper, 754 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
128. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354.
129. See Curry, Common Law Warranties, 1989 UNIv. TEX., DTPA: FROM THE BASICS
TO BAD FAITH LITIGATION 12-13.

130. 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
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to define what it was that made the services of optometrists "professional." 13 1 The court noted that optometrists were licensed by the
state and had statutorily defined duties.' 3 2 The shakiness of licensing
as a definitional foundation, however, has already been noted. In addition, the court pointed out that optometrists had special training to
use special instruments, and their acts "are described as an art with
many variables and call for an exercise of judgment by the practitioner." '3 3 While these characteristics undoubtedly apply to an optometrist, the same can be said of a carpenter.
All one can say for sure after a century and a half of Texas common
law development is that a "tubber" is not considered to be engaged in
the performance of a professional service. In Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Crazy Water Co. 13 4 we learn that a "tubber" was one whose duties
were "to assist a bather in preparing to take a bath, running the water,
testing the temperature and assisting the bather, when necessary, into
and out of the bath tub, etc." 13' 5 In contrast, the court defined a "profession" by explaining:
In some sense, of course, a profession involves labor, skill, education,
special knowledge and compensation or profit. The labor, as well as the
skill, however, involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather
than physical or manual. The education or special knowledge involved
is characterized by its use for others as distinguished from self, or as
sometimes said 'a practical dealing with affairs as distinguished from
mere study or investigation.' . . . As to the compensation or profits[,] 'It
is of the essence of a profession that the profits should be dependent
mainly upon the personal qualification of the person by whom it is car-

ried on.' ...136

Any failure of this definition to conclusively delimit the terms at issue
was foreshadowed by the court's early admission that:
The words 'profession' and 'professional' are used in many different
senses. We may be sure in any case that the words 'rendering professional services' refer to services pertaining to some profession rendered
by one in the pursuit of such profession. There would be no doubt that
the services thus referred to would not be menial services, or the serv-

131. Id. at 345.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 345-46.
134. 160 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, no writ).
135. Id. at 104.

136. Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
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ices of a common laborer. But, if we exclude such meaning of the
terms, the words may still mean one thing in a particular writing or in
reference to a particular subject-matter, and a very different thing in
another writing or in reference to another subject-matter.1 37
The court concluded that "tubbers" were not engaged in rendering

professional services. 138

The problem with attempting to define "professionals" is that the
inclusive definitions effectively render the term meaningless, while the
exclusive definitions make it elitist. To say members of a particular
trade or occupation are not professionals demeans them. To say
everyone is a professional demeans the word.
Tackling this definitional task would make the courts look bad.
Imagine trying to justify to a layman unschooled in legal subtleties
why it is that the state's highest civil court, all lawyers, has defined a
group of "professionals," which of course includes lawyers, who are
entitled to perform services for hire without being subject to the same
implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance owed by an
auto mechanic. The common law, being law that develops on a caseby-case basis as the needs of society and the litigants dictate, should
make sense to the common man. An exclusion for "professionals," by
appearing to favor already privileged groups, would deservedly engender cynicism.
Exempting "professionals" from any implied warranty of good and
workmanlike performance would also create the same type of illogical
disparity that led to the decision in Humber v. Morton 139 where the
supreme court first recognized an implied warranty that a home
would be built in a good and workmanlike manner." In casting
aside as outdated the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to
homebuilding, Justice Norvell scoffed at a legal rule by which "the
law seemingly concerns itself little with a transaction which may and
often does involve a purchaser's life savings, yet may afford relief by
raising an implied warranty of fitness when one is swindled in the
purchase of a two dollar fountain pen."'' It makes no sense to allow
a distinction in service transactions that grants protections from leaky

137. Id. at 104.

138. Id. at 105.
139. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
140. Id. at 555.
141. Id. at 561 n.7.
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washing machine connections but denies relief when the services affect someone's life, in the case of doctors, or their personal liberty or
property rights, in the case of lawyers. The better argument is that if
anyone should be held liable for failing to perform at the level expected of skilled member of their trade, professionals should be. They
have voluntarily entered into occupations involving greater responsibility and are often in a position to do greater harm through bad
work.
B.

What Is The Standard Of Care?

The fear that seems to motivate arguments for shielding professionals from the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance
is that the standard of care will be strict liability. Such a standard
would make all service providers guarantors of good results even
though the nature of some professions makes such a burden inappropriate. For example, a surgeon may perform skillfully, yet still lose
the patient. An attorney can lose a trial despite good and workmanlike lawyering. In these instances bad results do not prove bad conduct. A number of courts have refused to recognize implied
warranties for professional services precisely because they perceived
strict liability to be unfair when applied in that context, although liability based on negligence or some other concept of failure to meet an
accepted standard is allowed.' 4 2
142. See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 943 (3d Cir. 1968)(applying law of New Jersey and holding that no matter how it is described, basis of liability for
professional services is negligence); Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954)(test driller
not strictly liable for improper assertions as to amount of fill needed in residential lot); Stuart
v. Crestview Mut. Water Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 543, 549 (Ct. App. 1973)(engineer not strictly
liable for defective design of water system); Samuelson v. Chutich, 529 P.2d 631, 633 (Colo.
1974)(engineers do not impliedly warranty fitness of plans and specifications for intended use;
liability must be based on negligence); Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 462 N.E.2d 566,
571 (Ill. 1984)(architect does not imply or guarantee perfect plan or satisfactory result, but
could be liable for negligence); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277-78 (La. Ct. App.
1977)(lawyer could not be liable for implied warranty of favorable result, but could be found
negligent); Barrios v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 264 So. 2d 792, 794 (La. Ct. App. 1972)(implied
warranty cause of action allowed against doctor who failed to perform in conformity with
community standards); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn.
1983)(strict liability standard not applied to "second-guess" professional judgment of architects); City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978)(implied warranty/strict liability not applicable to judgmental work of architects and other vendors of
professional services); Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith,
400 A.2d 850, 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)(no strict liability based on breach of implied warranty by engineer); Toppino v. Herhahn, 673 P.2d 1297, 1300-01 (N.M. 1983)(im-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:685

If the Melody Home opinion had adopted an implied warranty of
results, the concern would be understandable and could justify the
unpleasant and difficult task of trying to distinguish between professionals and non-professionals. But the plain language of the Melody
Home opinion on rehearing makes clear that the implied warranty is
one of performance, not results. 4 3 The court expressly held: "We do
not require repairmen to guarantee the results of their work; we only
require those who repair or modify existing tangible goods or prop-

erty toperform those services in a good and workmanlike manner."'

44

The majority explicitly distinguished the new warranty of good workmanship from the strict liability imposed by other implied warranties,

saying: "In strict liability cases, the focus is on the product and not on
the conduct of the producer. By contrast, the inquiry in a breach of
1 45
warranty case concerns the performance of the service provider."
The court defined "good and workmanlike performance" as "that
quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training, or
experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by
those capable of judging such work."' 146 Although the court has

equivocated on whether, and how, this standard differs from simple
negligence, the implied warranty standard scarcely seems more
onerous.
There is no reason to suspect the court would impose liability that

plied warranty of results inapplicable to professional services of plastic surgeon); State v.
Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc., 653 P.2d 166, 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)(architects and other professionals do not warrant results but do "warranty" work performed
with skill customarily demanded of profession); Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim
Walter Corp., 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1977)(no strict liability claim against architect);
Nevauex v. Park Place Hosp., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)(strict products liability theories not applicable to radiation therapy by hospital);
Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n of Charleston, 219 S.E.2d 916, 918 (W. Va. 1975)(hospital not
liable under strict products liability/implied warranty theories for supplying tainted blood);
Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Wis. 1977)(court requires showing of negligence to
impose liability on physician for professional services).
143. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. 1987).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 355 n.8. The focus on performance is further highlighted by two Fifth Circuit
cases that hold a complete failure to perform does not breach this implied warranty. See
Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 855 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1988)(failure to repair steam turbine generator used to produce electricity); Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert,
Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1377 n.16 (5th Cir.), opinion
clarified, 832 F.2d 1378, 1379 (5th Cir. 1987)(warranty arises upon performance).
146. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354.
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was any more "strict" if it were to extend the warranty to professional
services. Even the three justices who dissented in Dennis v. Allison
never advocated that professionals be held to guarantee favorable results.' 4 7 Instead, they urged that at a minimum a professional should
"impliedly warrant that he will not breach the ethical commandments
of his calling in providing his services." 14' 8 Presumably, if a professional were to breach the ethical commandments of his or her profession, such conduct would not constitute performance generally
considered proficient by those capable of judging such work.
Complaining about the burdens of an implied warranty of good and
workmanlike performance is especially inappropriate for lawyers.
Lawyers already owe their clients a duty of utmost good faith and fair
dealing, and their dealings are already subject to the strict scrutiny of
a fiduciary relationship. 4 9 Lawyers already are ethically bound to
represent their clients "zealously."' 5 ° Lawyers already impliedly represent that they possess the learning, skill, and ability necessary to
practice law, that they will exert their best judgment in matters entrusted to them, and that they will exercise reasonable care in using
their skill and in applying their knowledge. 5 ' Holding that lawyers
impliedly warrant they will perform "that quality of work performed
by one who has the knowledge, training, or experience necessary for
the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a
manner generally considered proficient by those capable of judging
such work" adds no burden not already borne.
Moreover, it has long been the law in Texas that "Accompanying
every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a
negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as
a breach of contract."' 5 2 Whatever the differences between the standards of care imposed by negligence and the implied warranty of good

147. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. 1985)(Ray, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Ray, J.,dissenting).
149. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964); State v. Baker, 539 S.W.2d 367,
374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Dean, 240 S.W.2d 789, 791
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951, no writ).
150. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art.

X, § 9 (Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 1.01 (1990). A lawyer must represent a client
with zeal. Id. (comment 6).
151. Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ).
152. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:685

and workmanlike performance, it is difficult to see how the latter results in any substantial increases in the existing common law duties.
C. Difficulty of Proof
In Melody Home v. Barnes, the Texas Supreme Court approvingly
cited a number of court of appeals decisions that had recognized,
either explicitly or implicitly, implied warranties of good workmanship for brick patio construction, employment services, book printing,
house repairs, car repairs, swimming pool installation, printing, and
airplane repairs.153 It could be argued that in many of these cases
judging the quality of the services was easier than it would be in a
professional service transaction. In most of these cases, as with the
repairs in Melody Home, there was a tangible result that did not look
right or did not work right. In some "professional" contexts, judging
the performance by the outcome is not so easy, and the results may be
unreliable indicators of the quality of the services.
However, difficulty in proving that a professional failed to perform
properly is not a sufficient justification for refusing to let claimants
try. If it were, courts would refuse to allow suits for professional negligence. Although proving negligence in these cases may be harder
and may require expert testimony to ferret out and demonstrate the
substandard performance, negligence can be shown, and recovery is
available. Infrequently, a case may also arise where the result is so
blatantly bad that the outcome itself is proof of substandard performance, such as cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would
apply.

153. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 352 & n.2 (Tex. 1987). The
Melody Home court cited the following cases: Thrall v. Renno, 695 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(brick patio construction); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. PB-KBB, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(employment services); Griffin v. Eakin, 656 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(printing of books); Holifield v. Coronado Bldg., Inc., 594
S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ)(house repairs); Import
Motors, Inc. v. Matthews, 557 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(car repairs); Boman v. Woodmansee, 554 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, 1977,
no writ)(swimming pool installation); Trends, Inc. v. Stafford-Lowdon Co., 537 S.W.2d 778,
782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(printing work); Mercedes Dusting
Servs., Inc. v. Evans, 353 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no
writ)(airplane repairs).
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D. The Policy Factors in Melody Home
In Melody Home, the supreme court listed a number of public policy considerations that led the majority to recognize the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance.15 4 A review of these
points illustrates the concerns that should also influence the court's
decision with respect to "professional" services. The following considerations can be gleaned from the court's opinion:
(1) "Consumers of services did not have the protection of a statutory or common law implied warranty scheme";
(2) "the public interest in protecting consumers from inferior
services is paramount to any monetary damages imposed upon sellers who breach an implied warranty";
(3) "service providers are in a much better position to prevent
losses than are the consumers of the services";
(4) "[m]any services are so complicated and individually tailored
that a consumer is unable to independently determine quality and
must depend on the experience, skill, and expertise of the service
provider";
(5) "a consumer should be able to rely upon the expertise of the
service provider";
(6) "application of [an] implied warranty to services would encourage justifiable reliance on the service providers who would have
more incentive to increase and maintain the quality of the services
they provide";
(7) "a service provider is better able to absorb the cost of damages
associated with inferior services through insurance and price manipulation than is the individual consumer";
(8) "the caveat emptor rule as applied to services such as repairs
did a disservice to both ordinary prudent purchasers and to the industry by encouraging the purveyor of shoddy workmanship"; and
(9) recognizing an implied warranty actionable under the DTPA
"would further the policy of giving consumers an efficient and economical means of securing protection from poor quality services"
by allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees and discretionary
damages. 155

All of these considerations apply to professional service transac154. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 353-55 n.9.
155. Id.
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tions. (1) The same lack of remedy exists. (2) The public interest in
protecting consumers from inferior services should have even greater
force in professional service transactions, considering the economic
stakes and potential human costs are often greater than in non-professional transactions such as repairing a leaky sink. (3) Given their education and training, professionals, for the most part, should be in an
even better position to prevent losses. (4) As a rule, professional services are even more complicated, so the consumer is even less able to
independently determine quality. 5 6 (5) There is no reason consumers
should be any less able to rely on the expertise of professionals. To the
contrary, their reliance in such cases is even more justified by the fact
that the service provider is a "professional." (6) There is no reason to
expect that professionals will be any less responsive to the incentive to
increase and maintain the quality of their work. (7) Professionals are
more likely to be able to absorb the cost of inferior services through
insurance or price manipulation. (8) Professionals are more readily
identifiable as groups whose general reputation can be harmed by bad
actors, thus professionals should have an even greater desire to rid
their ranks of purveyors of shoddy services. (9) The same need for an
efficient and economical remedy exists in professional service transactions, especially in those cases in which a wrong could not otherwise
be feasibly redressed. It seems those who advocate exempting professionals from the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance have an insurmountable burden in trying to explain why these
considerations do not apply.
E.

A Surplus Remedy?

One final argument against recognizing an implied warranty that
professional services will be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner is that the remedy is unneeded. As the argument goes, ex15 7
isting remedies for breach of contract and negligence are sufficient.
The simple answer to this argument is that it comes too late. Whether
one agrees or disagrees with the need for an implied warranty of good
and workmanlike performance for service transactions at all, Texas
now has one.
156. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 345-46 (Tex. 1968)(presence of individualized services was one factor court used to define "professional" services).
157. See Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1985)(not necessary for court to
impose implied warranty because plaintiff has adequate remedies).
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The questions now are whether this existing remedy should be limited in its application to professional services and, if so, whether any
rational basis exists for defining the limitation. It bears noting that
even Justice Gonzalez, the most vocal critic of the majority holding in
Melody Home, agreed that some expansion of the available remedies
was justified. 5 8 His disagreement was with the scope of the expansion.' 59 It would be improper to now use general animosity toward
the implied warranty established in Melody Home as the unspoken
reason for imposing arbitrary limitations on its application.
Aside from the response that the "surplus remedy" argument
comes too late, there are substantive answers that justified rejection of
this argument in Melody Home. First, recognizing an implied warranty cause of action, which can be brought under the DTPA, promotes the legislative purpose reflected in the statute to provide
efficient and economical remedies to consumers." 6° Allowing recovery of attorney's fees encourages consumers to bring meritorious suits,
as does the potential recovery of discretionary damages. 161 A second
response, not clearly articulated in Melody Home, is that the causation standard for recovery under the implied warranty theory differs
from that for negligence. Negligence requires a showing that the conduct was a proximate cause of the damages; producing cause is the
standard for a warranty claim brought under the DTPA. The difference is that foreseeability is an element of the former but not the latter. 162 This difference reflects a conscious policy decision to shift
more of the burden of losses on to the party causing them. Such a
decision certainly follows from the policy considerations outlined in
63
Melody Home. 1
The "surplus remedy" argument is contradicted by another position taken by some critics of the implied warranty. The critics argue
that the new remedy provides unduly harsh penalties because it subjects service providers to treble damages under the DTPA. If the new
warranty really does add significant penalties, that argues that some158. Melody Home Mfg. Co. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Tex. 1987)(Gonzalez, J.,
concurring).
159. Id.
160. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987).
161. Id. § 17.50.
162. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 88 nn.l-2 (Tex. 1988)(Gonzlez, J.,
dissenting).
163. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353-55 n.9 (Tex. 1987).
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thing was lacking in the prior remedies and that the new one is not
redundant.
More significantly, complaints about "harsh" DTPA penalties raise
a false issue. Exemplary damages were already available at common
law, based on a showing of gross negligence or conscious indifference.
Prior to 1987, there was no fixed limit on these damages. Since that
date, certain types of personal injury and products liability cases are
subject to a cap on exemplary damages of no more than four times the
actual damages. ' In contrast, since 1979, DTPA damages beyond
the first $1,000 require a higher showing of culpability, "knowing"
conduct, and are discretionary with the jury.16 5 Moreover, the total
award of actual and additional damages cannot exceed a combined
award of three times the actual damages.1 66 Thus, a plaintiff suing
under the DTPA has a higher burden to get less money!
V.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court in Melody Home confronted and resolved the
broad issue of whether protection of consumers justified recognition
of a common law implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance of services. The policy decision was made; the warranty
was recognized.
All of the policy considerations relied on to support imposing the
warranty on any service provider apply with equal or greater force to
include professional service transactions within the scope of the warranty. As the preceding arguments demonstrate, the courts cannot
craft a plausible, workable test for including non-professional services
while excluding "professionals." Even if they could, they should not.
Professionals have no right to special treatment. Consumers are no
less deserving of protection when they are harmed by substandard
professional services.
The strongest argument for shielding a professional from liability
turns out to be a false one. Professionals will not be held strictly liable, nor will they be required to guarantee results that are beyond
their control. The implied warranty recognized in Melody Home is
firmly based on the concept of fault. Liability follows from a failure
to perform at the level "generally considered proficient by those capa164. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003, .007 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
165. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987).
166. Id.
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ble of judging such work," not from a bad outcome. At bottom, services providers-professional or non-professional-are held to warrant
what they already owe, a duty to perform reasonably.
With the warranty defined as it was in Melody Home, there are no
unique countervailing arguments for exempting professionals. When
the issue is presented, the Texas Supreme Court should rule that professionals and non-professionals alike warrant they will perform their
services in a good and workmanlike manner.1 67

167. For additional readings on some of the topics covered by this article, see, e.g., Alderman & Rosenthal, A Consumer Update: Recent Developments Under the Texas Deceptive
Trade PracticesAct, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 495, 509-16 (1989); Curry, Common Law Warranties,
1989 UNIv. TEX., DTPA: FROM THE BASICS TO BAD FAITH LITIGATION 12-13; Krahmer,
Warranties: UCC, in 1989 UNIV. TEX., DTPA: FROM THE BASICS TO BAD FAITH LITIGATION; Maxwell, Statutory and Common Law Remediesfor Denialof Insurance Claims, in 1989
UNIV. TEX., DTPA: FROM THE BASICS TO BAD FAITH LITIGATION 17-18; Comment, The
Implied Warranty of Good and Workmanlike Performance Extends to Professional Services
That Involve the Modification of an Existing Tangible Good: Archibald v. Act III Arabians,
755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988), 30 S.TEX L. REV. 491 (1989); Comment, Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes: An Implied Warranty is Created, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 321 (1988); Comment, An Implied Warranty of Good and Workmanlike Quality Extends to the Repair and
Modification of Existing Tangible Goods: Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 741
S.W.2d 349 (1987), 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1141 (1988); Comment, Breach of Implied Warranty Under the DTPA as Applied to Service Contracts: Diversified Human Resources Group,
Inc. v. PB-KBB, Inc., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 549 (1985); Note, Consumer Protection- Deceptive
Trade Practices- Breach of Implied Warranty Requiring Goods or Property to Be Modified or
Repaired in Good and Workmanlike MannerActionable Under Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 47
(November 4, 1987), 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 791 (1988); Recent Development, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
731 (1989).
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